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Abstract. To participate in the distributed consensus of permissionless
blockchains, prospective nodes – or miners – provide proof of designated,
costly resources. However, in contrast to the intended decentralization,
current data on blockchain mining unveils increased concentration of
these resources in a few major entities, typically mining pools. To study
strategic considerations in this setting, we employ the concept of Oceanic
Games [27]. Oceanic Games have been used to analyze decision making in
corporate settings with small numbers of dominant players (sharehold-
ers) and large numbers of individually insignificant players, the ocean.
Unlike standard equilibrium models, they focus on measuring the value
(or power) per entity and per unit of resource in a given distribution of
resources. These values are viewed as strategic components in coalition
formations, mergers and resource acquisitions. Considering such issues
relevant to blockchain governance and long-term sustainability, we adapt
oceanic games to blockchain mining and illustrate the defined concepts
via examples. The application of existing results reveals incentives for in-
dividual miners to merge in order to increase the value of their resources.
This offers an alternative perspective to the observed centralization and
concentration of mining power. Beyond numerical simulations, we use the
model to identify issues relevant to the design of future cryptocurrencies
and formulate prospective research questions.
Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies, Resources, Mining Pools,
Oceanic Games, Values.
1 Introduction
Decentralization is a core element in the design of permissionless blockchains. To
participate in the blockchain consensus mechanisms, prospective network nodes
– also called miners – need to provide proof of some costly resource. This re-
source may be computational power in protocols with Proof of Work (PoW)
selection mechanisms, [28,15], or coins of the native cryptocurrency in Proof of
Stake (PoS) selection mechanisms, [8,5]. Under default conditions, the selection
is proportional to miners’ resources and hence, it depends on their actual dis-
tribution. An integral assumption in the security philosophy of permissionless
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blockchains is that the network of mining nodes remains “sufficiently” decen-
tralized and distributed. In the extreme case, sufficiently means that no single
entity holds 50% or more of the resources but in practice much more fragmenta-
tion may be desired to safeguard the safety properties of the underlying protocol
[11,22,3].
With this in mind, the picture illustrated in Table 1 is disconcerting. Table 1
Bitcoin Ethereum
Entity (Pool) Blocks (%) Entity (Pool) Blocks (%)
1. BTC.com 18.2 Ethermine 28.2
2. AntPool 14.7 Sparkpool 21.4
3. F2Pool 12.6 Nanopool 12.6
4. SlushPool 10.1 F2Pool 2 12.4
5. BTC.TOP 7.9 MiningPoolHub 1 5.6
6. ViaBTC 7.9 DwarfPool 1 1.9
7. DPOOL 4.1 PandaMiner 1.8
8. BitFury 2.3 firepool 1.6
9. BitClub Network 2.3 Address 1 1.4
10. Bitcoin.com 1 MinerallPool 1.1
Unknown/other 18.9 Unknown/other 12.0
Table 1. Distribution of the blocks mined in the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains.
Mining is dominated by few major miners, typically mining pools, numbered from 1
to 10 and a great number of minor players in the “Unkown/other” category. Source:
blockchain.com and etherscan.io, 5 March 2019.
shows the distribution of blocks among miners in the two largest3 cryptocur-
rencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, and indicates that the desired assumption of
a highly decentralized (and distributed) network is currently not satisfied. As
can be seen, the vast majority of mining resources is concentrated in a small
number of “major” nodes or mining pools in which individual miners join forces
to reduce the variance of their payments [14,34]. The rest is scattered among
a large number of minor and individually insignificant miners. The discrepancy
between the intended distribution and the concentration of resources that is ob-
served in practice raises some questions. What is the actual power of such pools
or major miners to influence the evolution of the blockchain? Does this distri-
bution create incentives for mergers and formation of coalitions (cartels) that
will seize control of the majority of resources and manipulate the blockchain
[26,24]? What strategic considerations arise and what are their implications on
blockchain governance and long-term sustainability?
Similar questions have been examined by conventional economics in the con-
text of corporate governance. To study interactions between shareholders with
3 In terms of market capitalization, cf. coinmarketcap.com.
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various degrees of power in particular, [27] developed the model of Oceanic
Games. These are games featuring a mixture of few large players (shareholders)
and a continuum of infinitesimal players, called the ocean, each of which holds
an insignificant fraction of corporate shares. The resemblance with blockchain
mining – with shares corresponding to units of mining resources – is apparent.
Our goal in this paper is to explore incentives in blockchain mining from the
perspective of Oceanic Games and complement existing studies that focus on
safety and security related issues [29,13,9].
The central idea in the literature of Oceanic Games is the measurement of
a value for each entity and for each unit of resource given the distribution of
resources among shareholders. The concept of value is considered as a powerful
tool in the theory of decision making [2,33,31] and [32]. For instance, if a miner
holds 51% of the total resources, then each of her units is worth much more than
if she holds only 49% of the total resources, since in the former case, the entirety
of her shares gives her absolute control over the blockchain. Similar, but maybe
less obvious considerations, arise also in intermediate cases. If a miner holds 49%
of the resources and a second miner holds 2% of the resources, then both miner’s
resources value higher than in the case in which the first miner only holds 47%
of the resources, since in the former case, the two miners may collude and jointly
seize control of the blockchain.
Motivated by these considerations, we adapt the model of Oceanic Games
from [27] on blockchain mining. Our aim is to measure the value of mining
resources per miner and per unit of resource as a strategic component in the
process of power gain and coalition formation between mining nodes. With this
approach, we shift our attention from safety attacks and equilibration models,
[20,12], to the understanding of incentives related to the distribution and ac-
quisition of protocol resources. The analysis of these issues is relevant to the
broader subjects of long term sustainability and blockchain governance [7].
Based on the above, our contribution in the present paper can be summarized
in the following points
– We model instances of blockchain mining as Oceanic Games: the discrete set
of large players corresponds to the large mining nodes, typically mining pools,
and the continuum of infinitesimal oceanic players to the remaining, individ-
ual miners, cf. Figure 1. Conveniently, the resulting model does not depend
on the underlying selection mechanism (PoW, PoS or similar) or consensus
protocol and hence can be used for the study of resource acquisition, strategic
interactions, coalition formations (mergers) and governance related issues in a
broad spectrum of permissionless blockchains [16,9,30,21,18,4,10]. We extend
an example of [27] to illustrate the defined concepts in blockchain context.
– The application of existing results uncovers incentives for the formation of
mergers between miners. Starting from an initial distribution in which the
oceanic players control the majority of resources, we use simulations to show
that this holds in two instances: first, in the formation – crystallization –
of a coalition out of the ocean and second, in the exogenous acquisition of
additional resources by a group of individual miners who, nevertheless, have
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Fig. 1. Illustration of centralization in blockchain mining. Miners join forces in few
major mining pools (blue), M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, which dominate the mining process.
The remaining small miners (light red) – or the ocean, I – mine individually.
the ability to coordinate their actions (collude). In both cases, the value of
the miners’ resources is higher when they act as a single entity rather than
individual, oceanic players. This result provides an alternative perspective to
the observed centralization in cryptocurrency mining, cf. Table 1.
– Further numerical simulations demonstrate that the above conclusions do not
hold in the whole range of parameters. Instead, the dynamics of coalition
formations and entry barriers are shown to depend on the current distribution
of mining resources among major miners and the ocean.
– Finally, we use this model to raise issues relevant to the design of future
cryptocurrencies and formulate prospective research questions.
In general, the present paper can be seen as a first step towards the appli-
cation of the Oceanic Game concept in blockchain mining. Beyond some first
insight, the extent to which this model can provide further results in the issues
of (de)centralization, blockchain governance and long-term sustainability is yet
to be fully understood.
1.1 Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model
of Oceanic Games and give an example to illustrate the defined notions. Reve-
lant results from [27] and their application in blockchain settings are shown in
Section 3 along with numerical simulations. In Section 4, we raise related issues
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and research questions and discuss limitations of the current approach. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 The Model: Oceanic Games on the Blockchain
The current model adjusts the notation and terminology of [27] in a standard
blockchain setting.
Miners: The miners are the physical entities that participate in the block pro-
posal and creation process. The term is used here in the broadest sense and
depending on the underlying protocol and selection mechanism, it may refer to
“conventional” miners as in PoW, [28], or to virtual miners as in PoS or other
alternative forms [8]. The set of miners consists of two distinctive components
– A finite, discrete set M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of major miners or mining pools.
– An interval I = [0, 1] of infinitesimal miners. We refer to I as the ocean and
to miners in I, as oceanic players. We only consider subsets U = [u1, u2] ⊆ I
of the ocean I, e.g. U = [0.1, 0.5], and not individual oceanic players.
Resources: To participate in the distributed consensus, each miner needs to
provide proof of some designated, costly resource. This may be a physical or
digital asset such as computational power in PoW or native coins in PoS mech-
anisms, respectively. To describe these resources, we use following notation
– A set of real numbers r1, r2, . . . , rm ≥ 0, where ri denotes the amount of
resources of miner i ∈M . For any subset S ⊆M , we will write r (S) = ∑i∈S ri
to denote the total resources of miners in S.
– A positive constant α > 0 which denotes the total resources of the ocean I.
Accordingly, any subset U = [u1, u2] ⊆ I controls α · |U | of resources where
|U | = u2 − u1.
Based on the above, the total protocol resources R are equal to R := α+
∑
i∈M ri.
While resources change over time, in the present analysis, we will focus on a single
period or a static setting and hence, unless indicated otherwise, our notation is
independent of the time t. Resources may be expressed as absolute numbers or
percentages but this will be made explicitly clear from the context.
Blockhain Oceanic Games: Given the above, a blockchain oceanic game Γ
is defined by a majority quota, q ≥ 0, using the symbol4
Γ := [q; r1, r2, . . . , rm;α]
4 The notation is common in the literature of weighted voting games, see [31,32] and
[25] for a more related application. Also, in most cases, we will be interested in
q = 0.5 or 50% but the current model applies to any q of interest.
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with the following interpretation: a coalition of miners C := S ∪ U with S ⊆M
and U ⊆ I wins in the game Γ , if and only if its total resources are larger than
or equal to q, i.e., if
r (C) := r (S) + α · |U | ≥ q
Addition of resources: Given an oceanic game Γ , we want to study the sit-
uation in which new entities acquire resources and enter the protocol. For this,
we will use the notation Γ+ with
Γ+ := [q; r1, r2, . . . , rm, rm+1;α]
and M+ = {1, 2, . . . ,m,m+ 1}. In words, Γ+ results from Γ by the addition of
a new major player m+ 1 with exogenous resources rm+1 > 0. Similar notation
can be used to denote the formation of a new entity crystallizing out of the
ocean. In this case, Γ+ := [q; r1, r2, . . . , rm, rm+1;α− rm+1] for some rm+1 > 0,
and M = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,m+ 1}.
Values: The first core functionality of the present model is to calculate a value
ϕi for each major miner i ∈ M and one value Φ for the entirety of the oceanic
players, also referred to as the oceanic value. Each miner’s value depends on
that miner’s share of resources and on the total distribution of the remaining
resources among the rest of major and oceanic miners. To define the miner’s
values ϕi, i ∈ M and the oceanic value Φ, let X1, X2, . . . , Xm be independent
random variables uniformly distributed on I = [0, 1]. For each x ∈ I, let r (x) :=∑
j∈M rj ·1{Xj < x}, where 1{Xj < x} = 1 if Xj < x and 0 otherwise (indicator
function). Then, the value of miner i ∈M is defined by
ϕi := Prob [r (Xi) + αXi < q ≤ r (Xi) + αXi + ri] (1)
and the oceanic value by Φ := 1 −∑i∈M ϕi. Intuitively, the value ϕi is the
probability that miner i will be the crucial entity to turn a random coalition of
miners from losing (total resources of the coalition without i are less than q) to
winning (total resources of the coalition with i are equal to or greater than q)5.
Value-per-unit of resource: The second functionality of this model is to de-
termine the value per-unit of resource or power ratio, vi, for each player i ∈M ,
which is defined by
vi := ϕi/ri (2)
Similarly, the value per oceanic unit of resource or oceanic power ratio, voc, is
equal to voc := Φ/α.
2.1 An Example: Why Values and not Shares?
We illustrate the above with the help of an example adapted from [27, Section
6]. We consider a mining situation with two major mining entities or pools,
5 For more details and the probabilistic derivation of these values, we refer to [27].
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M = {1, 2}, and the simple majority quota q = 0.5 represented by the following
game Γ = [0.5; r1, r2;α], where α = 1−r1−r2. The 0.5 or 50% quota corresponds
to cntrol of the majority of protocol resources and hence, of the blockchain as a
whole. In this game a coalition S wins, if r (S) ≥ 0.5, i.e., if it occupies 50% or
more of the protocol resources6.
All possible resource configurations (r1, r2, α) are illustrated in Figure 2.
The horizontal and vertical axes represent miner 1’s and miner 2’s fraction of
the resources, respectively. Their possible combinations are divided in 4 inner
regions, ∆i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Region ∆1 contains all configurations for which the
combined resources of both major miner are less than 50%, i.e., r1 + r2 ≤ 0.5. In
this case, the majority of resources is controlled by oceanic players. However, the
ocean is not actually “in control”, since, by assumption, there is no coherence
nor organizational structure between oceanic players. The explanation of regions
∆2,∆3 and ∆4 is similar and is briefly given in the legend of Figure 2.
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Region ∆i:
∆1: Ocean “in control”
∆2: Balance of power
∆3: Miner 1 in control
∆4: Miner 2 in control
0.5 ≤ α
0 ≤ r1, r2, α ≤ 1/2
0.5 ≤ r1
0.5 ≤ r2
Fig. 2. All possible configurations in the distribution of resources (r1, r2) between 2
major miners and the ocean, α.
Using (1), the value ϕ1 of the first major miner is given by
ϕ1 =

r1r¯2
α2 , if (r1, r2) ∈ ∆1(
1−2r2
2α
)2
, if (r1, r2) ∈ ∆2
1, if (r1, r2) ∈ ∆3
0, if (r1, r2) ∈ ∆4
(3)
with r¯i := α− rj for i = 1, 2 and j = 3− i. The value ϕ2 of Miner 2 is analogous
and the oceanic value Φ is simply equal to Φ = 1− ϕ1 − ϕ2.
The interpretation of the values in the extreme regions ∆3 and ∆4 is straight-
forward. In ∆3, miner 1 controls more than 50% of the resources and hence, has
6 Due to continuity properties, there is no difference between using the q = 50% quota
or symbolically, the q = 51% quota, as is common in the related literature [28,11,22].
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absolute power over the blockchain. This implies that her value is equal to 1 and
consequently, the value for both miner 2 and the oceanic miners is 0. Region
∆4 is similar. The interesting cases arise whenever (r1, r2) ∈ ∆2, i.e., when the
major miners and the ocean, each control less than 50% of the resources, or
(r1, r2) ∈ ∆1, i.e., when the resources controlled by the ocean account for more
than half of the total resources. This case is also referred to as the interior case
in the original paper. Some instantiations in regions ∆1 and ∆2 are presented
in Table 2.
Resources % Values % Ratios
r1 r2 α ϕ1 ϕ2 Φ v1 v2 voc
∆1: Interior Game 40 9 51 65 4 31 1.62 0.42 0.62
30 19 51 37 15 48 1.23 0.81 0.94
25 24 51 26 24 50 1.04 1.00 0.98
∆2: Balance of Power 35 20 45 44 11 44 1.27 0.56 0.99
40 30 30 44 11 44 1.11 0.37 1.48
40 40 20 25 25 50 0.63 0.63 2.5
Table 2. Resources, values and values per unit of resource for various configurations in
the ∆1 and ∆2 regions. The resources ri, i = 1, 2 are selected arbitrarily, α = 1−r1−r2,
the values ϕ, i = 1, 2 and Φ are given by (3) and the ratios vi, i = 1, 2 and voc by (2).
An indicative observation – which does not aim to an exhaustive analysis of
the above measurements – is that the values and the ratios unveil disparities
between shares and actual influence or power of the participating entities. For
example, there are instances, as in the (40, 9, 51)-configuration (first row in ∆1),
in which a major miners’ ratio is larger than the ratio of oceanic players. This
imbalance generates a motive for oceanic players to merge with that miner to
increase the power of their individual resources. Equivalently, the large miner
has an increased influence to attract resources from the ocean. The picture is
totally different in the (40, 40, 20)-configuration (third row of ∆2), in which the
competition between the major miners raises the value of resources owned by the
ocenic players. Both cases can be contrasted to the stability in the (25, 24, 51)-
configuration, in which all 3 ratios are approximately equal to 1.
Yet, as argued in [27], the interpretation of values should be done with cau-
tion and only in addition to complementary analytical tools. This is because
values do not take into account qualitative factors such as ethical commitments,
operational constraints or other kinds of incentives.
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3 Individual Mining is not Stable
A direct outcome of applying the model of Oceanic Games in the blockchain
context is the next result due to [27]. Both parts of Theorem 1 make critical use
of the assumption that the majority of mining resources is controlled by oceanic
players. Their proof relies on a recursion in the number m of major miners and
can be found in [27]. Here, we will focus on the interpretation of Theorem 1 and
its application in blockchain context.
Theorem 1 ([27]). Let Γ = [0.5; r1, r2, . . . , rm;α] with M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be a
blockchain oceanic game, such that r (M) < 0.5 ≤ α, i.e., such that the majority
of mining resources is controlled by individual (oceanic) miners. Then
(a) The value ϕi of any major player i ∈M in Γ is given by
ϕi =
ri
αm
∑
S⊆M−{i}
cs∏
j∈S
rj
∏
k/∈S
(α− rk)

where cs := s!
[
1
s! − 1(s−1)! + · · ·+ (−1)s
]
and s := |S| is the number of major
miners in S. The oceanic value Φ is equal to Φ = 1−∑i∈M ϕi.
(b) If Γ+ = [0.5; r1, r2, . . . , rm, rm+1;α] for some rm+1 > 0, and Φ
+, ϕ+i , i =
1, . . . ,m+ 1 are the values in Γ+, then
ϕ+m+1/rm+1 = Φ/α
or equivalently, v+m+1 = voc.
Interpretation of Theorem 1. Statement (a) of Theorem 1 is an analytical
result which yields the exact formula to compute the values of the major miners
and the ocean. Its usefuleness will become aparent in the applications. Statement
(b) carries more intuition. It states that the value-per-unit of resource of a miner
entering Γ is equal to the oceanic value-per-unit of resource in Γ . One possible
interpretation, also supported by [27], is that this provides a stability argument in
favor of decentralization, in the sense that there is no incentive for the formation
of a “cartel” or a mining pool, provided that the size of the ocean is big enough,
i.e., provided that the ocean controls the majority of the resources7.
However, as we will see in the following applications, this picture is misleading
and decentralization is actually not stable. In practice, the oceanic value per unit
of resource in Γ+ can go below the value per unit of resource of the crystallizing
or newly entering entity. Hence, given that a set of miners can coordinate their
actions, then it may be beneficial for them to either crystallize out of the ocean
or to acquire exogenous resources and form in both cases a single mining entity.
7 This statement actually holds for any quota q ∈ (0, 1) and not only for q = 0.5 as
formulated here.
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3.1 Applications of Theorem 1
The above interpretations of Theorem 1 are illustrated via the simulation of two
representative scenarios. In both cases, we assess the stability of initial distribu-
tions of mining resources, in which the majority of resources is controlled by the
ocean. This is achieved by comparing the oceanic value per unit of resource to
the value per unit of resource of the same miners when acting as single entity.
I. Crystallization out of the ocean: In the first scenario, we consider an in-
stance of the blockchain oceanic game in which all resources are initially con-
trolled by oceanic players. This is described by the game Γ = [50%;α = 100]
and M = ∅. Then, we simulate a gradual formation of a single mining entity by
the process of crystallization out of the ocean. This is captured by a sequence
of games (instances) Γ+ = [50%; r1;α] with 0 < r1 < 50 and α = 100− r1. For
each instance, we calculate the value per unit of resource of the single entity
that is forming out of the ocean and compare it with the value per unit of
oceanic resource. The results are shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. The value per unit of resource of a single entity, m = 1, that is forming by
mergers (crystallization) out of the ocean (red line) and the value per unit of oceanic
resource (blue line). The total percentage of resources that is controlled by the crys-
tallizing entity is shown in the horizontal axis.
It is apparent that v1 is higher than voc even for arbitrarily low values of r1
and that the difference is increasing in the percentage of crystallized resources.
This uncovers a motive for coalition formations and merging between miners,
even if the initial distribution is perfectly decentralized. Further simulations
(not shown here) demonstrate that the same picture continues to hold even
if M 6= ∅, as long as α > 50% and no single miner in M holds a percentage
close to 50%. If there exists a “large” miner i ∈ M with, e.g., ri > 40%, then
the oceanic players may be disincentivized to collude. However, this is only a
semblance of stability, since in this case, oceanic miners have an incentive to
merge with the “large” miner.
II. Acquisition of exogenous resources: In the second scenario, we consider
miners who are acquiring exogenous resources to enter the mining process. We
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assume that these miners can either enter the ocean and mine individually or
collude and form a single mining entity. We want to compare the value per unit
of resource in these two cases. Formally, we denote the current distribution of
resources by Γ = [50%; r1, r2, . . . , rm;α] with α > 50% and the total mining
resources of the new entities by w. We want to compare
– v+m+1 := ϕ
+
m+1/w in the game Γ
+ := [50%; r1, r2, . . . , rm, w;α] to
– vooc := Φ
o/ (α+ w) in the game Γ o := [50%; r1, r2, . . . , rm;α+ w].
The game Γ+ describes the instance in which the entering miners merge in a
single mining entity and the game Γ o the instance in which the entering miners
become part of the ocean and mine individually. We assume that initially, the
majority of resources is controlled by oceanic players and that there exist two
other major mining entities. It turns out that the share of mining resources of
the other major entities influences the incentives of the entering miners. To see
this, we consider two cases.
Case 1: Let Γ = [50%; 6, 4; 90], so that Γ+ = [50%; 6, 4, w; 90] and Γ o =
[50%; 6, 4; 90 + w] for any w > 0. As shown in Figure 4, in this case, both
major miners are not large enough to create entry barriers for the third entity
and v+m+1 > v
o
oc for any w > 0. In agreement with Theorem 1(b), the value per
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Fig. 4. The value per unit of resource of the entering miners when they enter as a single
entity (red line) and their value per unit of resource when they enter as individual
oceanic miners (blue line). The additional resources are shown as a percentage of the
total resources in the horizontal axis.
unit of resource, v+3 , of the new miners when they enter as a single entity is
equal to the oceanic value voc in the initial game Γ (red line). According to [27]
this implies that “there is no incentive for a new entity to form”. However,
this only says half the truth. As we can see by the blue line, if the newly
entering miners enter the ocean as individual miners, then their value per unit
of resource will be lower compared to the case in which they collude. Hence,
given that a group of entering miners are capable to coordinate their actions,
then they are better off if they enter as a single entity than as oceanic players.
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Case 2: Let Γ = [50%; 55, 5; 90], so that Γ+ = [50%; 55, 5, w; 90] and Γ o =
[50%; 55, 5; 90 + w] for any w > 0. As shown in Figure 5, in this case, the
presence of major miner 1 seems to create a disincentive for a forming coalition
and v+m+1 < v
o
oc for any w > 0 such that w + 90 < 50%. The resulting
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Fig. 5. The value per unit of resource of the entering miners when they enter as a single
entity (red line) and their value per unit of resource when they enter as individual
oceanic miners (blue line). The additional resources are shown as a percentage of the
total resources in the horizontal axis.
picture shows that we cannot generalize the outcome of the previous case. In
particular, we conclude that whether the entering miners have an incentive
to form a single entity or to join the ocean as individual miners, may depend
on the actual distribution of resources among the existing major miners and
the ocean. However, this is only a semblance of stability, stemming from an
already centralized initial distibution (r1 > 33%). In this case, oceanic miners
actually have a stronger incentive to merge with miner 1 instead of forming a
new entity.
The previous simulations create an inconclusive picture. In general, the incentives
for miners to merge seem to depend on the current distribution of resources. Since
blockchain mining is a dynamical system that evolves over time, they suggest
that even if the blockchain starts from a sufficiently decentralized point, then
it is unlikely to remain decentralized also in the future or equivalently that
decentralization creates a negative feedback loop, [36,19]. The dynamics of the
coalition formation process and the entry barriers resemble these of conventional
economic markets of either perfect or oligopolistic competition. These findings
provide an alternative perspective to cryptocurrency mining along with [1], and
suggest the need for further research in this direction.
III. Revisiting Bitcoin and Ethereum: Finally, we return to the current
distribution of resources in Bitcoin and Ethereum and estimate the values per
unit of resource for each mining entity, cf. Table 1. For this, we use the publicly
available ssocean software. The results are presented in Figure 6.
The horizontal axis represents the mining pools and the ocean as given in Table 1
in descending order, i.e., with “1” corresponding to the largest miner and “11”
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Fig. 6. Value per unit of resource of current Bitcoin (red, left panel) and Ethereum
(blue, right panel) mining entities: big miners and the ocean.
to oceanic miners. The results are revealing: excluding a minor knick in the
Ethereum graph, the largest the mining pool, the largest the value per unit of
resource.
4 General Issues, Research Perspectives & Limitations
The application of the oceanic-game model in blockchain mining opens new
research perspectives but also has its own limitations. Beyond the insight from
existing results, a complete model needs to account for the additional challenges
and address the questions that are specific to the blockchain context. In the
following discussion, we raise such relevant issues, discuss their connection and
research possibilities via the current model and identify potential limitations.
Cryptocurrencies as Resources: The difference between PoW and PoS in
terms of their resources – computational power versus native coins – has a direct
impact on both the mining process and the value of the underlying cryptocur-
rency. When coins are used as mining resources (PoS protocols), their value de-
pends on their distribution among existing miners, their availability for prospec-
tive miners and the returns (profits) from mining. This in contrast to PoW
protocols, in which the price of the resources – e.g., hardware and electricity –
is not tied to the price of the underlying cryptocurrency.
Resource Acquisition & Entry Barriers: The above suggest that the na-
ture of protocol resources may also generate different entry barriers. In PoS, the
acquisition of protocol resources, i.e., coins, by prospective nodes depends on the
willingness of current owners to exchange their coins and the way that new coins
are minted. Different configurations may lead to high entry barriers and central-
ization. In PoW, computational power is essentially unlimited and acquisition
of additional resources is independent of the underlying cryptocurrency. This
implies lower entry barriers but also more frequent changes in the configuration
(distribution) of resources among miners.
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In particular, the current cost of acquiring enough computational power to con-
trol the majority in the Bitcoin and Ethereum PoW-blockchains is estimated
at 1.5 billion US Dollars [6]. This amount is well within the budget of several
physical or legal entities worldwide. Moreover, it is independent of the value of
the underlying cryptocurrency and depends only on the size of the network and
the hardware and electricity costs. With this in mind, it is natural to ask: how
stable are PoW blockchains against arbitrary authorities able to acquire the ma-
jority of resources? How relevant are these questions to the current distribution
of resources and how do they translate in the PoS setting?
In this context, further work on blockchain oceanic games can aid the community
to raise and study questions about investment in cryptocurrencies. When viewed
not only as assets but also as means to gain power in the mining process and
the governance of a blockchain, cryptocurrencies fit to the current perspective
and their mechanics can be better understood.
Mathematical Modelling: From a mathematical perspective, oceanic games
bridge the gap between atomic and non-atomic congestion games [23]. Yet, the
use of values instead of equlibria to study real settings has its own limitations
[27,32]. This is mainly due to the probabilistic derivation of values, which ig-
nores qualitative aspects such as ethical commitments, preferences or any other
motives of the participating agents. However, despite these limitations, if prop-
erly interpreted, values can become a powerful tool in the analysis of strategic
interactions. In an immediate direction, they can be used to rethink the notion
of blockchain fairness or equitability, which is currently based on the theoreti-
cally tentative premise that one unit of resource – one vote also implies fairness
[13,35].
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we employed the concept of Oceanic Games [27], to model and
study strategic interactions in blockchain mining. Oceanic Games have been used
in conventional economics to analyze decision making in corporate settings with
a small number of major players – shareholders or here, mining pools – and
a continuum of minor, individually insignificant players, called the ocean. This
stream of literature focuses on the measurement of the value per miner and per
unit of resource for each miner given a distribution of resources. Values are then
interpreted as strategic components in decisions related to resource acquisition,
mergers and coalition formations and offer an alternative perspective to the
common equilibration models.
An immediate implication of existing results was that given a sufficiently
large initial distribution of resources, there are incentives both for active and
for newly entering miners to merge (form cartels or coalitions) and act as single
entities. These observations provide an alternative justification of the observed
centralization and concentration of power in the mining process of the major
cryptocurrencies. Contrary to common perceptions, they amount to the existence
of a negative feedback loop in terms of decentralization as a core ingredient in
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permissionless blockchain philosophy, [17], and reveal the need for futher research
in this direction. In a general discussion, we identified critical issues related to
resource acquisition, entry barriers and centralization risks in blockchain mining
and formulated relevant questions that may be answered by further exploration
of the present model. These findings can be placed in the broader context of
governance and long-term sustainability for pemissionless blockchains.
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